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Introduction
Since the time of Aristotle's students, interpreters have considered Prior
Analytics to be a treatise about deductive reasoning-more generally, about
methods of determining the validity and invalidity of premise-conclusion
arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to leam more about
deductive reasoning and to improve their own reasoning skills. Some people
naively and irresponsibly thought that the deductive reasoning described by
Aristotle was entirely adequate for derivation of the theorems of geometry from
the basic premises. Moreover, even such perceptive people as Boole who were
insightful about the gross lack of comprehensiveness in the mIes of deduction
attributed to Aristotle nevertheless understood Aristotle to be treating the process
of deducing conclusions implied by given premise-sets. These interpreters
understood Aristotle to be focusing on two epistemic processes : First, the
process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion follows necessarily from a
set of premises (that is, on the epistemic process of extracting information
implicit in explicitly given information) and, second, the process of establishing
knowledge that a conclusion does not follow. Despite the overwhelming
tendency to interpret the syllogistic as formal epistemology, it was not until the
early 1970s that it occurred to anyone to think that Aristotle may have developed
a theory of deductive reasoning with a well worked-out system of deductions
comparable in rigor and precision with systenls such as propositional logic or
equationallogic familiar from mathenlatical logic.
When modem logicians in the 1920s and 1930s first tumed their attention to
the problem of understanding Aristotle's contribution to logic in modem terms,
they were guided both by the Frege-Russell conception of logic as formal
ontology and at the same time by adesire to protect Aristotle from possible
charges of psychologism. They thought they saw Aristotle applying the informal
axiomatic method to formal ontology, not as making the first steps into formal
epistemology. They did not notice Aristotle's description of deductive reasoning.
Ironically, the formal axiomatic method (in which one explicitly presents not
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merely the substantive axioms but also the deductive processes used to derive
theorems from the axioms) is incipient in Aristotle's presentation.
Partly in opposition to the axiomatic, ontically-oriented approach to Aristotle's
logic and partly as a result of attempting to increase the degree of fit between
interpretation and text, logicians in the 1970s working independently came to
remarkably similar conclusions to the effect that Aristotle indeed had produced
the first system of formal deductions. They concluded that Aristotle had analyzed
the process of deduction and that his achievement included a system of natural
deductions including both direct and indirect deductions which, though simple
and rudimentary, was semantically complete.
Where the interpretations of the 1920s and 1930s attribute to Aristotle a
system of propositions organized deductively, the interpretations of the 1970s
attribute to Aristotle a system of deductions, extended deductive discourses,
concatenations of propositions , organized epistemically. The logicians of the
1920s and 1930s take Aristotle to be deducing laws of logic fronl axiomatic
origins; the logicians of the 1970s take Aristotle to be describing the process of
deduction and in particular to be describing deductions themselves, both those
deductions that are proofs based on axiomatic premises and those deductions
that, though deductively cogent, do not establish the truth of the conclusion but
only that the conclusion is implied by the premise-set.
Thus, two very different and opposed interpretations had emerged, interest-
ingly both products of modem logicians equipped with the theoretical apparatus
of mathematicallogic. The issue at stake between these two interpretations is the
historical question of Aristotle's place in the history of logic and of his
orientation in philosophy of logic. This paper affirms Aristotle's place as the
founder of logic taken as formal epistemology, including the study of deductive
reasoning. A by-product of this study of Aristotle's acconlplishments in logic is
a clarification of a distinction implicit in discourses among logicians-that
between logic as formal ontology and logic as formal epistemology.
Aristotle's Logic: New Goals, New Results
Our understanding of Aristotle's logic has increased enormously in the last
sixty years. It is gratifying to review the cascade of progress beginning with the
independently achieved but remarkably similar advances reported in 1929 by Jan
Lukasiewicz and in 1938 by James Wilkinson Miller. Penetrating examination
and critical evaluation of the Lukasiewicz-Miller viewpoint in the 1950s and
1960s set the stage for work in the early 1970s by Timothy Smiley and myself.
Subsequent work in the late 1970s and early 1980s by various people including
Timothy Smiley, Robin Smith, Michael Scanlan and myself can be seen as
culminating, at least for the moment, in the 1989 translation and commentary
on Prior Analytics by Robin Smith.
Since the early 1970s the progress has been dialectical rather than linearly
cumulative, and the spirit of objectivity and sympathetic criticism currently
pervading the field makes it likely that the dialectical paradigm will continue.
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Each succeeding contribution not only benefitted from and built on previous
efforts but it also found itself refining, revising, correcting, and refllting various
features of previous efforts, often previous efforts by the same author. There is
no such thing as a unique fixed contenlporary doctrine on Aristotle's logic.
Indeed, as far as I know, none of the current investigators has yet to become
committed to a definitive viewpoint although there is wide agreement on loose,
general principles.
In some instances, e.g. Smith's 1982 work on ecthetic deduction, progress
was made by widening the range of Aristotelian processes amenable to treatment
by modem methods of symbolic logic. In some cases, e.g. Scanlan's 1983 work
on issues of compactness in the Analytics, progress consisted largely in
clarifying issues and correcting errors of previous works. In some cases, e. g.
the independent work by Smiley and by myself on syllogistic deduction,
progress involved radically increasing the degree of fit required between modem
interpretative reconstruction and the Aristotelian text. Neither Lukasiewicz nor
Miller attempted to reconstruct a logical system originally presented by
Aristotle. Cf. Corcoran and Scanlan 1982, 78-79. The repayment for these two
independent attempts at increasing the precision of interpretation was a sweeping
revision of our understanding of Aristotle's most fundamental concepts,
methods, and goals. In retrospect it is difficult to imagine two types of
interpretative theories more thoroughly different than those proposed before
World War 11 by Lukasiewicz and by Miller, on one hand, and those proposed
twenty-five years after the war by Smiley and by myself, on the other.
The pre-war Lukasiewicz-Miller view takes Aristotle's main concems in Prior
Analytics to be ontic, to the exclusion of epistemic concems. Lukasiewicz goes
so far as to say that the logic of Prior Analytics per se has nothing to do with
thinking, that it concems thought per se no more than does a mathematical
theory. It is true of course that this nonepistemic approach was motivated in part
in order to defend Aristotle from false charges of psychologism. The post-war
Smiley-Corcoran view takes Aristotle's main focus to be on epistemic concems,
as opposed to but not excluding ontic concems. According to this view, among
other things Aristotle was concemed with how human beings deduce a
conclusion from premises that logically imply it. More generally, Aristotle was
concemed with the methodology of deduction and counterargumentation: with
how we know that this conclusion follows logically from these premises and
with how we know that this conclusion does not follow from these premises.
These questions, according to the Smiley-Corcoran view, were motivated largely
by Aristotle's concem to understand the axiomatic method that he treats in the
Posterior Analytics and that was practiced in the Academy. Prior Analytics
studies an aspect of the axiomatic method; it does not use the axiomatic methode
Thus the Lukasiewicz-Miller view attributes to Aristotle's Prior Analytics a
goal drastically different from the goal attributed by the Smiley-Corcoran view.
One should expect then that the methods attributed to Aristotle would likewise
differ significantly and indeed this is the case, with some curious qualifications
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and exceptions. The main exception has to do with the already mentioned fact
that neither Lukasiewicz nor Miller claims to have reconstructed a system
actually to be found in Prior Analytics, or even an approximation thereof. It is
a bizarre irony that defenders of the Lukasiewicz-Miller view are often found
to be claiming for the view merits that its originators disclaimed.
Instead of having as a goal understanding the processes of determining
whether or not a given conclusion follows from a given premise-set, Lukasie-
wicz and Miller think that Aristotle's goal is the establishing as true or as false,
as the case may be, of certain universally quantified conditional propositions,
vize those that 'correspond' to what have been called valid and invalid
categorical arguments with arbitrarily large premise sets. For example, the
following is to be established as true: given any three terms A, B, and C, if A
belongs to every B and C belongs to no A, then B belongs to no C. And the
following is to be established as false: given any three terms A, B, and C, if A
belongs to every B and B belongs to every C, then C belongs to every A. In
contrast , according to Smiley and Corcoran, Aristotle's goal rather was to
develop and apply a method of deductive reasoning to deduce a proposition 'B
belongs to no C' from propositions 'A belongs to every B' and 'c belongs to no
A', and in regard to the second example, the Smiley-Corcoran view is that
Aristotle's goal was to exhibit a method for establishing that a proposition 'c
belongs to every A' is not a necessary consequence of propositions 'A belongs
to every B' and 'B belongs to every C'. According to the Smiley-Corcoran
viewpoint, examples of the first sort, Le., establishing that a given conclusion
follows from given premises that actually imply it, are handled by Aristotle's
method of deduction which involves both direct (ostensive) deductions and
indirect (per impossible) deductions. Aristotle's method of deduction is treated
in more detail below. Here I want to indicate that because Lukasiewicz does not
realize what Aristotle is doing with indirect deductions, Lukasiewicz thinks that
Aristotle does not understand per impossible reasoning. In fact, he thinks that
Aristotle's misunderstanding of indirect reasoning was so defective that Aristotle
commits a fallacy not just here and there but each and every time it is used in
the syllogistic. See Corcoran 1974. According to the Smiley-Corcoran
viewpoint, exanlples of the second sort, i.e. establishing that a given conclusion
does not follow from given premises actually not implying it, are handled by
Aristotle's method of counterarguments which consist in exhibiting another
argument in the same form having premises known to be true and conclusion
known to be false. Lukasiewicz also thinks that this method is fundamentally
flawed. See Lukasiewicz 1957, 72. It is worth noting that the two interpreta-
tions, the pre-war as well as the post-war, are in complete agreement that
Aristotle's syllogisms are not abstract forms (whether forms of propositions,
forms of arguments or forms of deductions). In the case of the Lukasiewicz-
Miller view, the 'terms' of the syllogism (indicated by letters A, B, C above)
are actually object-Ianguage variables, not piace-holders in forms. In the case
of the Smiley-Corcoran view, the 'terms' are concrete substantives such as
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'human,' 'animal, ' 'plant,' etc. There is no evidence whatever to support the
widespread belief that Aristotle postulated abstract forms over and above
concrete propositions, concrete argunlents, or concrete deductions. Indeed, such
postulation would have been characteristically platonistic and nonaristotelian.
The Background of Aristotle's Logic
In order to appreciate what is accomplished in the Organon, more specifical-
ly, in the Analytics, it is necessary to have some appreciation of the state of
development of geometry and arithmetic in the Academy during the period
immediately preceding and during Aristotle's writing of these works. It is also
helpful to be aware of Plato's attitude toward the mathematical knowledge of his
time and to understand Plato's views on the role of mathematical knowledge in
education and in intellectuallife. Some graduates of modem universities do not
achieve knowledge of mathematics comparable to that required by Plato for
admission as a beginner in the Academy. Plato believed that mathematical
knowledge serves as a paradigm of knowledge itself, a paradigm through which
people may come to grasp the nature of knowledge and to realize the criteria
that must be applied to distinguish genuine knowledge from mere belief. Cf.,
e.g. Republic, Book 7, 525a-527c and VIastos 1988, 138.
Especially important for appreciating Aristotle's logic is acquaintance with
dialectic, with the Socratic method of hypotheses and with the method of
analysis as applied in geometry. Cf. Hintikka and Remes 1974 and Corcoran
1979. Perhaps the most important fact to bear in mind is that an axiomatically
organized geometry text was in use in the Academy when Aristotle was a
student. Cf. Heath 1926, i, 116. This geometry text probably resembled the
book by Euclid that came to replace it. Cf. Knorr 1975, 7, 22.
Two points of resemblance are especially relevant. Firstly, two kinds of proof
were used. On the one hand there were direct proofs which erased doubt and
established knowledge of their conclusions by so-to-speak building up the
conclusion from material already established. On the other hand there were
indirect proofs which erased doubt and established their conclusions by so-to-
speak first inviting the doubt to be openly embraced for purposes of reasoning
and then showing that such embrace was in conflict with already established
results.
The second point of resemblance is the orientation toward the ontic as
opposed to the epistemic; this is not to impose a dichotomy or to suggest that in
actual practice one orientation excludes attending to the other. Rather one should
say that in a typical axiomatization of a science there is an orientation toward
the ontology of the science, toward the class of objects comprising the subject-
matter or genus of the science, rather than on the process or processes of
knowledge being employed. Euclid, e.g., sets forth the basic axioms and
definitions first and then, without saying anything about the processes of
deduction to be used, he proceeds to the extended elaboration of one chain of
reasoning after the other.
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This pattern of articulating the ontic while leaving the epistemic in an
unarticulated and tacit state is repeated in axiomatization after axiomatization
even up to the present day. For more on this point, including aremark by
Alonzo Church, see Corcoran 1973, especially pages 24-29. People are
sometimes surprised to leam that Hilbert's famous 1899 axiomatization of
geometry, though carefully stating the axioms in clear naturallanguage (not in
a symbolic language), proceeds to deduce consequence after consequence
without any discussion of the methods used. In other words, the geometrical
axioms are presented but the mIes of deduction from the underIying logic are
left tacit.
Church 1956, 27 speaks of the informal axiomatic method when the
underlying system of deductions is left tacit as in Euclid's Elements and
Hilbert's 1899 Grundlagen; he contrasts it with what he calls the formal
axiomatic method wherein the deductions themselves are formally analyzed and
made explicit. Using Church's terminology one can say that Lukasiewicz and
Miller are on firm ground when they imply that Aristotle did not use the formal
axiomatic methode See e.g. Lukasiewicz 1929, 106. They think that Aristotle's
syllogistic is an application of the informal axiomatic method and thus, in
particuIar, that Aristotle does not articulate the mIes of deduction of his
syllogistic system. According to the Smiley-Corcoran view, Aristotie did not
employ the formal axiomatic method in the syllogistic because he did not employ
any axiomatic method there. However, in Prior Analytics Aristotle does indeed
present a fully explicit and self-contained system of deductions with meticulously
described mIes of deduction and with what amounts to a definition of a complete
set of formal deductions including direct deductions and indirect deductions.
Thus, according to the Smiley-Corcoran view, although Aristotle does not apply
any axiomatic method (whether formal or informal) in Prior Analytics he does
make the essential first step beyond the informal axiomatic method toward the
formal axiomatic method by clearly indicating the possibility of articulating the
means of deduction.
Intuition and Deduction: Two Epistemic Processes
In an axiomatization of a science the information is concentrated in the
propositions explicitly stated as axioms and this information is extracted from
the axiom set and amplified, often in surprising ways, in the course of the
development of the series of theorems. The theorems are all contained in the
axiom set, as is shown by the chains of reasoning that extract them. The
information processing techniques, which are typically not explicit, are not
regarded as part of the axiomatization but rather as mIes of deduction in the
underlying Iogic presupposed by the axiomatization in question and presupposed
by other axiomatizations of the same science or of different sciences. The axiom
set is proper to the particular science under study but the underlying Iogic is
topical neutral.
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In order for a proposition to be an axiom it is not sufficient for it to be true;
it must be known to be true by the scientist. In order for an information
processing technique to be a rule of deduction it is not sufficient for it to be
logically sound; it must be cogent or logically epistemic for the persons who use
the underlying logic. Compare Quine 1986, pages 49, 83, and 98. To say that
an information processing technique, or information transformation, is logically
sound is to say that the result of applying the process has no information not
already in the information that it is applied to, Le., that the information or the
resultant or conclusion is contained in its raw material of premises. Put another
way, a logically sound process produces from a given set of premises conclu-
sions that are logically implied by that set. A conclusion is logically implied by
a given premise-set if it is logically impossible for the conclusion to be false
were the premises all true, Le. if the negation of the conclusion contradicts the
premise-set. But not every logically sound information process is a rule of
deduction of an underlying logic; a rule of deduction has the appropriate
evidentiality or obviousness, it must be usable by persons to produce knowledge
that a conclusion is implied by given premises. For more on this point see
Weaver 1988.
The epistemically effective information processing relevant to the axiomatic
method, and to the hypothetical method used by Socrates and to the analytic
method used in geometry, serves to extract information implicit in the
propositions to which it is applied, in other words, to produce logical conse-
quences from premises, and to do it in a way that makes evident to those using
the processes that the conclusions indeed foIIow. These epistemic processes have
come to be known collectively as deduction. The process of establishing the
axioms to begin with has been called intuition recently; an earlier term still in
use this way is induction See Hintikka 1980 and Corcoran 1982. All three words
are ambiguous.
In the hypothetical method, deduction is used to determine consequences of
a hypothesis which is rejected as false when one of its consequences is
determined to be false. The process of deduction, being part of the underlying
logic, merely determines implied consequences of propositions. Deduction
applies to information content per se; it is not limited merely to true propositions
and certainly not merely to propositions already known to be true.
To say that deduction is truth-preserving is an understatement at best; it is
usually an insensitive and misleading half-truth; and it often betrays ignorance
of logical insights already achieved by Aristotle. See Myhill 1960, 461-463.
Deduction is not merely truth-preserving, it is information-conservative, Le.
consequence-conservative in the sense that every consequence of a proposition
deduced from a given set of propositions is already a consequence of the given
set; there is no information in the deduced proposition not already in the set of
propositions from which it was deduced. Not every truth-preserving transforma-
tion is consequence-conservative, but, ofcourse, every consequence-conservative
transformation is truth-preserving. For example, the rule of mathematical
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induction is truth-preserving but not consequence-conservative. See the Appendix
below.
The epistemic status of knowledge ofaxioms contrasts sharply with that of
knowledge of deduction. The former is propositional knowledge (or 'know-that')
whereas the lauer is operational knowledge (or 'know-how'); it is an epistemic
skill. To avoid confusion we should note that intuition and deduction are both
operational knowledge; the one productive of propositional knowledge, the other
productive of implicational knowledge, Le. knowledge that a given proposition
is logically implied by a given set of propositions .
The initial-versus-derivative distinction applies both to propositional
knowledge in the narrow sense and to implicational knowledge, Le. to results
of pure deduction. There are clear senses in which in an axiomatic science the
axioms are initial and the theorems are derivative. When we turn to the
processes by which the theorems are deduced from the axioms we see the step-
by-step reasoning reported in what are called deductions; a deduction is a
discourse or argumentation composed of a premise-set, a conclusion, and a chain
of reasoning that makes evident that the conclusion follows logically from the
premise-set. These chains of reasoning also break down into initial and
derivative. The initial chains of reasoning are those which are composed of a
single link, so to speak: these are the chains in which the conclusion is deduced
immediately from the premise-set. The derivative chains are constructed by
concatenating the initial chains. Just as axioms are epistemically fundamental in
the realm of propositional knowledge, the initial chains of reasoning are
fundamental in the realm of deduction. The proximate product of the deductive
process is the chain of reasoning that forms the core of the discourse or
argumentation that we call a deduction. There are many interesting analogies
between the realm of propositional knowledge and other realms of knowledge.
Here we have mentioned only one: an axiom is to a theorem as an immediate
(one-link) chain of reasoning is to a mediated (multi-link) chain of reasoning.
For further discussion see Corcoran 1989. Aristotle was fully aware of both of
the above applications of the initial-versus-derivative distinction: that in the
realm of known propositions and that in the realm of epistemically effective
chains of reasoning.
The initial-versus-derivative distinction in the realm of known propositions is
implicit in Aristotle's view that every proposition known to be true is either
known by 'induction' or deduced by a chain of immediate inferences whose
ultimate premises are known by induction. This of course is closely related to
Aristotle's truth-and-consequence conception 0/proo/, vize that demonstrating
the truth of a proposition is accomplished by showing that it is a logical
consequence of propositions already known to be true. The initial-versus-
derivative distinction in the realm of cogent argumentations is exemplified in
Aristotle's theory of the completing of syllogism: an incomplete (or 'imperfect')
syllogism is completed ('perfected') by chaining together simple syllogisms that
are already complete in themselves ('perfect').
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It should be noticed that the initial-versus-derivative distinction applies in
many other places as well; it would be amistake to think that it is limited to
axiomatic sciences and systems of deductions. The ordinary recursive grammars
used by modern symbolic 10gicians apply this distinction to formalized
languages: the 'atomic' fornlulas are initial and the 'molecular' formulas are
derivative. In fact, the initial-versus-derivative distinction is applied in several
ways in the context of a formalized language. In Corcoran 1976, several kinds
of recursive (or generative) grammars are discussed: term grammars that
generate derivative terms from initial terms, sentential grammars that generate
derivative sentences from initial sentences, deduction grammars that generate
derivative deductive discourses (designed to express chains of reasoning) from
initial deductive discourses, and 'theorem grammars' (or axiomatizations) that
generate propositions (theorems) deductively known from propositions (axionls)
known initially without use of deduction.
Every axiomatic system involves an initial-versus-derivative structure. But,
as is almost too obvious to mention, not every system involving an initial-versus-
derivative structure is axiomatic. Thus detection of an initial-versus-derivative
structure in a certain text is no sign that the text contains an axionlatic systenl.
In particular, the fact that the Aristotelian syllogistic system has an initial-
versus-derivative structure with the 'perfect' syllogisms as initial does not imply
that the syllogistic is an axiomatic system. Never once does Aristotle apply to
a perfect syllogism one of the terms that he characteristically uses elsewhere for
axiom per se.
There are several ways of misconstruing Aristotle's syllogistic as an axiomatic
system; Lukasiewicz 1951 is representative of one type of misconstrual while
Parry and Hacker 1991 represents an entirely different type of misconstrual. The
'perfect' syllogisms do have a certain priority, they are fundamental, they are
basic, the 'imperfect' syllogisms are known through the 'perfect' ones.
Nevertheless, the 'perfect' syllogisms are not axioms for Aristotle and the
syllogistic is not an axiomatic system.
Logic as Formal Ontology
There are several different conceptions of the nature of logic. Here I want to
contrast an ontic conception with an epistemic conception. On one ontic
conception logic investigates certain general aspects of 'reality', of 'being as
such', in itself and without regard to how (or even whether) it may be known
by thinking agents: in this connection logic has been calledformal ontology. On
one epistemic conception, logic amounts to an investigation of deductive
reasoning per se without regard to what it is reasoning about; it investigates
what has been calledformal reasoning. On this view, logic is part of epistemolo-
gy, vize the part that studies the operational knowledge known as deduction. It
has been said that one of the main goals of epistemically-oriented logic is to
explicate the expression 'by logical reasoning' as it occurs in sentences such as:
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a deduction shows how its conclusion can be obtained by logical reasoning from
its premise-set.
Relevant to the axiomatic method there would be two branches of epistemolo-
gy: one to account for knowledge of the axioms and one to account for how
knowledge of the theorems is obtained from knowledge of the axioms, in other
words, one investigating induction and one investigating deduction. The latter
is logic according to the epistemic conception.
On the ontic view of logic, on the other hand, logic is an attempt to gain
knowledge of the truth of propositions expressible using only generic nouns
(individual, property, relation, etc.) and other 'logical' expressions. In the
framework of Principia Mathematica those are propositions expressible using
only variables and logical constants. Principia Mathematica is an excellent
example of an axiomatic presentation of logic as formal ontology. Below are
some typical laws of formal ontology.
Excluded middle: Given any individual and any property either the
property belongs to the individual or the property does not belong to
the individual.
Noncontradiction: Given any individual and any property it is not the
case that the property both belongs to the individual and does not
belong to the individual.
Identity: Given any individual and any property, if the property
belongs to the individual then the individual has the property.
Dictum de omni: Every property A belonging to everything having
a given property B which in turn belongs to everything having
another property C likewise belongs to everything having that other
property C.
Dictum de nullo: Every property A belonging to nothing having a
given property B which in turn belongs to everything having another
property C likewise belongs to nothing having that other property C.
Commutation 0/ Complementation with Conversion: Given any
relation R the complement of the converse of R is the converse of the
complement of R.
From this sampie of logic as ontic science we can see how the focus is on
ontology, or, as has been said by others, on the most general features of reality
itself and not on methods of gaining knowledge. According to Russell 1919,
169, 'logic is concemed with the real world just as truly as zoology, though
with its more abstract and general features.' These six laws are purely ontic in
that they involve no concepts concerning a knowing agent or conceming an
epistemic faculty such as perception, judgement, or deduction. This is not to
deny that there is an epistemic dimension to logic as ontic science but only to
affirm that the focus if ontic. Every science in so far as it is science has an
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epistemic dimension. The epistemic differs from the ontic more as size differs
from shape than as, say, animal differs from plant.
Logic as ontic science was referred to above as formal ontology. Logic as
epistemic metascience may in like manner be called formal epistemology. It is
important and interesting to note that both are called formal logic but for very
different reasons. Some formal onticists justify the adjective formal by reference
to the fact that its propositions are expressed exclusively in general logical terms
without the use of names denoting particular objects, particular properties, etc.
cf. Russell 1919, 197. Some formal epistenlicists justify the adjective formal by
reference to the fact that the cogency of an argumentation is subject to a
principle of form and in particular to the following principles: (1) every two
argumentations in the same form are either both cogent or both noncogent, (2)
every argumentation in the same form as adeduction is itself adeduction. In
fact, some formal epistemicists such as Boole claimed, with some justification,
that they were dealing with the forms of thought, Le. with the forms of cogent
argumentations. For more on cogency of argumentations and the principles of
form see Corcoran 1989.
Formal onticists are often easy to recognize because of their tendency to
emphasize the fact that formal ontology does not study reasoningper se. In fact,
the formal onticists often think that the study of reasoning belongs to psychology
and not to logic. For example, Lukasiewicz in his famous book on Aristotle's
syllogistic makes the following two revealing remarks. Lukasiewicz 1957 pages
12 and 73, respectively. 'Logic has no more to do with thinking than mathemat-
ics.' ,[Aristotle's] system is not a theory of the forms of thought nor is it
dependent on psychology; it is similar to a mathematical theory ... '
There are significant differences among formal onticists. For example, even
among those that emphasize the truth-preserving character of deduction some
accept the view that it is consequences-conservative as well and some reject this
view. For example, Lukasiewicz 1929, 16 explicitly rejects the view that
deduction is a process of information extraction. He says that in deductive
inference ' ...we may obtain quite new results, not contained in the premises'.
Conclusion
The tendency of interpreters to find an epistemically-oriented theory in
Aristotle has been overwhelming. With the exception of James Wilkinson
Miller's 1938 book and the writings of Jan Lukasiewicz and those directly
influenced by these two, few interpreters have found a theory of formal ontology
in Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Down through the ages, with these exceptions,
interpreters have agreed that Prior Analytics is about methods of deternlining
validity and invalidity of arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to
leam more about deductive reasoning and in order to improve their own
reasoning skills.
Despite the overwhelming tendency to interpret the syllogistic epistemically
it wasn't until the early 1970s that it occurred to anyone to wonder whether
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Aristotle had a developed theory of deductive reasoning with a well worked-out
system of deductions comparable in rigor and precision with the systems then
fanliliar from mathematical logic. Of the logicians that studied Prior Analyties
from this point of view, two of them published articles in same twelve-month
period with remarkably similar systems affirming in clear and unequivocal terms
the epistemic nature of Prior Analyties: Corcoran 1972 and Smiley 1973.
The simpler of the two articles holds that Aristotle's theory of deductions
recognizes two kinds of extended deductions of conclusions from arbitrarily
large premise sets: direct deductions and indirect deductions. A direct deduction
of a conclusion from given premises begins with the premises and proceeds by
chaining together simple one-premise and two-premise inferences until the
conclusion is reached. An indirect deduction of a given conclusion from given
premises is in effect a direct deduction of a pair of contradictory opposites from
the premises augmented by the contradictory opposite of the conclusion. This
view is spelled out in more detail in the introduction to Smith's 1989 translation
of Aristotle's Prior Analyties.
According to the ontic interpretation the syllogistic is a system of true
propositions about inclusional relations among classes. It is a system which is
organized deductively, axioms followed by deduced theorems, by employment
of an underlying logic never explicitly mentioned by Aristotle. It is a system
whose place in the Organon, in Greek philosophy, and in the history of
philosophy raises many problems. When we turn to the epistemic interpretation
the changes are dramatic. From the epistemic perspective the syllogistic is a
system of deductions or chains-of-reasoning. It is organized according to an
initial-versus-derivative structure with the derivative components as chainings of
initial components. It is a system which can be seen to explain epistemic
processes of deduction presupposed by the Socratic hypothetical method, by the
so-called method of analysis, by the axiomatic method and even by dialectic
itself. According to the epistemic interpretation, the focus of the syllogistic is
on methods as opposed to results; it concems the process of deduction rather
than conclusions per se. One might say that it concems how to think rather than
what to think. And it is a step toward understanding the nature of proof as
opposed to persuasion and toward fulfilling the demand made by Socrates in the
Phaedo for a teehne logike. This step made by Aristotle was so firm, so
detailed, and so well-developed that it warrants the title of THE FOUNDING
OF LOGIC.
Appendix
The word eonservative is used in connection with political thinking in several
senses, two of which are relevant here. On the one hand, a person's thinking is
called conservative to the extent that he aims at preserving and protecting what
he takes to be traditional principles and values. On the other hand, a person's
thinking is called conservative to the extent that he aims at preventing new
principles and values from being realized. The word eonservative in the
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expressions information-conservative and consequence-conservative is used in
analogy with the second, negative or privative sense. In an application of an
infornlation-conservative or consequence-conservative process the resultant
contains no information not in the premises processed; such a process 'prevents'
new information from intruding.
Uses of hyphenated, adjectival expressions ending with 'conserving',
'conservative', 'preserving', and 'preservative' seem to be intrinsically
confusing. Use of such expressions withol)t explanation and waming is
misleading. For example, 'information-conserving' suggests the bizarre condition
that the resultant contain all of the information contained in the datum, exactly
the reverse of what is wanted. 'Every rectangle is a parallelogram and every
square is a rectangle' contains all of the information contained in its conse-
quence, 'Every square is a parallelogram' , not the other way around.
We can say that a given process is contained in or constrained by a given
relation if in every application the premises or raw material is in the given
relation to the resultant. A truth-preserving process is constrained by material
implication but not by logical implication, whereas a consequence-conservative
process is constrained by logical implication (and thus also a fortiori by material
implication) .
To see that not every truth-preserving process is consequence-conservative it
is sufficient to consider the rule of mathematical induction which, for example,
when applied to the two propositions 'zero is even' and 'every natural number
which is the successor of an even natural number is even' results in 'every
natural number is even.' This resultant is materially implied by the given
premise-set since the second premise is false and, of course, every proposition
is materially implied by every set of propositions having a false member. On the
other hand, the resultant is not logically implied by the given premise-set. To
see this use the method of counterarguments : 'zero is integral' and 'every real
number which is the successor of an integral real number is integral' are both
true whereas 'every real nUITlber is integral' is false, of course; one-half is not
integral, for example.
The rule of mathematical induction, which is applicable only to propositions
about the natural numbers (or, what amounts to the same thing, to sentences
interpreted appropriately in the universe of natural numbers), is a rule of
inference in Frege's sense but, as we have seen, it is not a rule of deduction in
the information-extracting sense usual in logic. There are rules of derivation, let
us say, which are truth-preserving but which are not even rules of inference.
One extreme case is what I call the rule of truth-deriving: from an arbitrary set
of propositions derive an arbitrary true proposition. This example shows that the
property of being truth-preserving could not merit the emphasis that it has
gotten.
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